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Abstract
In this paper we study how a society can transition between different economic and
political regimes. When the current regime is elitism, the society is modeled as a collection
of units of land where at each of these units there is a member of the elite and a peasant.
Members of the elite represent the institutions in place and their role is to choose how
extractive the current regime is via setting up different tax rates. The role of peasants is
to work the land and pay taxes. At every period with some small probability a critical
juncture arrives, giving members of the elite a chance to update institutions (tax rates)
and peasants an opportunity to revolt in order to instate a populist regime. Under the
populist regime, at each of the units of land there is a citizen whose role is to work the
land and enjoy the full output he produces. When a critical juncture arrives in this case,
citizens have the option to stage a coup in order to revert back to elitism. In our results
we characterize the possible outcomes after a critical juncture and study how the society
can transition between regimes depending on the different parameters of the model.
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1 Introduction
Consider a society where few of its members, the elite, have ownership of the different eco-
nomic activities. The rest of the society, peasants, are the ones that work on each of the
different economic activities producing a certain output, a share of which is given to the elite.
How extractive institutions are, i.e. how the output is shared between the elite and peasants,
is decided by the elite and the only chance peasants have at changing the regime is via a
revolution. Examples of these societies are, for instance, feudalism where each economic ac-
tivity is simply a piece of land, or dictatorships where citizens work in the different economic
activities and the ministers of the regime and government officials choose how much output
to extract from peasants.
Throughout the history of civilizations societies as the ones described above have been
abundant, from the medieval feudalism in Europe in the 10th century, to the military dicta-
torships in certain Asian and African countries in the present century. A frequent feature of
these societies is that whenever they have evolved to different regimes, the change was usually
triggered by what is know as a critical juncture (see Collier and Collier (1991) among others).
A critical juncture can be defined as a “a major event or confluence of factors disrupting the
existing economic or political balance in society” (Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), see also
Capoccia and Kelemen (2007)). Examples of critical junctures are international events such
as the discovery of the Americas, the Black Death or more recently the Arab Spring, as well
as national events like the Cuban Revolution.
In this paper we present a model that tries to explain the factors that influence the
possible outcomes after a critical juncture, as well as study how a society can transition
between different regimes. To this end, we consider a society that is divided into different
units of land. If the current economic and political regime is elitism, we assume that in each
of these units of land there is a member of the elite and a peasant. The role of the member
of the elite is to decide how extractive institutions in place are via setting up a tax rate. The
role of the peasant is to work the land in order to produce a certain output which is shared
between the member of the elite and the peasant according to the tax rate. If the current
regime is populism, at each of the units of land there is a citizen whose role is to work the
land and enjoy the full output he produces.
At every period with some very small probability a critical juncture arrives. In the event
of a critical juncture, players have a chance to update their actions. Under elitism, members
of the elite react to the critical juncture by adapting the institutions to the new circumstances,
i.e. updating the tax rate they charge to peasants. After members of the elite have reacted
to the critical juncture, peasants may stage a revolution. The revolution can be successful
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at overruling the current regime depending on how many peasants join the revolt. If the
current regime is overruled, the elite is eliminated and a populist regime is installed: there is
no distinction between members of the society and each citizen works on a unit of land and
enjoys the full output he produces. When a critical juncture arrives under populism, citizens
have a chance to stage a coup in order to revert back to elitism and become the new elite.
Within the setting just described, we study what are the possible outcomes after a critical
juncture and whether or not a regime change can occur. In our results, we find that under
elitism there are four different types of institutions that could emerge after a critical juncture:
first, institutions such that the tax rate is the most extractive one and such that no peasant
revolts (oppressive regime), second, institutions that are moderately extractive and such that
a regime change is possible (unstable regime), third, institutions such that different units of
land have different tax rates (segregated regime) and, finally, institutions where all peasants
revolt and a regime change occurs with probability one (regime change). When the current
regime is populism, we find that there are three possible outcomes after a critical juncture:
first, no citizen stages a coup and populism continues after the critical juncture (stable
democracy), second, a few citizens stage a coup and try to become the new elite (unstable
democracy), and third, all citizens stage a coup and elitism is re-instated (regime change).
We complete our analysis by trying to get a better understanding of how different factors such
as output shocks and land profitability affect the specific outcomes after a critical juncture.
Our results illustrate situations such as how the fact that the economy may be going
through a period of recession affects the resulting institutions after a critical juncture. For
instance, we find that a wider output gap can increase the number of different institutions
that are possible after a critical juncture. This helps in understanding why there may be
heterogeneity in the institutions established in different countries during the Arab Spring,
why different institutions arose in North America compared to South America during the
colonization period, or why feudalism disappeared in western Europe but it intensified in
eastern Europe after the Black Death (Acemoglu and Robinson (2012))
Moreover, when introducing our results later on we also explain how different current and
historical episodes relate to each of the different equilibria of our model. We discuss how,
for instance, the segregated regime equilibrium found in our model relates with what was
observed after the critical juncture caused by the end of World War II, where Korea was
divided in two countries with different autocratic regimes during the Korean War.
Our model is based on the work by Acemoglu and Robinson (2001a).1 However, a key
difference in our modeling approach allow us to study the effects of critical junctures from
a perspective that to our knowledge has not been used before. The main difference between
1See also Acemoglu and Robinson (2000a, 2000b, 2001b) and Acemoglu et al (2001).
3
our model and the various models in Acemoglu and Robinson (2000a, 2000b, 2001b) is that
we explicitly model the cooperation/coordination problem faced by players (elite, peasants
and citizens, depending on the current regime). In our paper, each member of the elite is free
to set up any tax rate he desires for his own unit of land and, hence, members the elite are
playing a cooperation game with each other: each member of the elite would like the other
members of the elite to choose a low tax rate so that no peasant revolts, a situation which
would allow such member of the elite to set up a high tax rate in his unit of land without
the risk of having his peasant join the revolution. In Acemoglu and Robinson (2000a, 2000b,
2001b) the elite is aggregated into a single player (all members of the elite choose the same
tax rate) and, thus, they do not study the elite’s cooperation problem.2 Moreover, the
probability that there is a regime change (successful revolution or coup) in our paper is an
increasing function on the number of players that attempt the regime change. This means
that peasants or citizens (depending on the current regime) play a coordination game with
each other whenever a critical juncture a arrives. In the models of Acemoglu and Robinson
(2000a, 2000b, 2001b), a regime change happens if and only if a given number of players
attempt a regime change. Thus, the unique equilibrium outcome in their work is that either
all players attempt a regime change or none do. In our paper we shall see how equilibria
where some players attempt a regime change and others do not are possible. A situation
where some but not all peasants revolt, or citizens stage a coup, is not only a more realistic
scenario but, crucially, equilibria where only a fraction of the players attempt a regime change
will prove important in understanding the possible outcomes after a critical juncture.
Another departure from previous literature (Acemoglu and Robinson (2000a, 2000b,
2001b) and relevant references herein) is that in our setting equilibria multiplicity is possible.
Equilibria multiplicity should not be surprising given the inherent coordination problem that
a revolution or a coup entails. This is true even though several attempts have been made
to reconcile the coordination problem faced by peasants and citizens with the simplifying
assumption by which either all or no player attempts a regime change (i.e. the collective
action problem, see also Lichbach (1995), Moore (1995) or Popkin (1979)).
Also related to our work is the literature on coordination in games of regime change (global
games). Carlsson and van Damme (1993), Morris and Shin (1998) and Morris and Shin (2004)
among others solve the equilibria multiplicity problem by adding uncertainty about the game
that is actually played, by adding noisy about the fundamentals, or by introducing uncertainty
in the number of players needed for a regime change respectively. Edmon (2013) considers a
game of regime change where there is uncertainty about the strength of the current regime
2In our model, there will be equilibria where all members of the elite choose the same tax rate (and equilibria
where they do not). Therefore, the fact that the elite may behave as one single player will be an endogenous
result in this paper instead of an exogenous assumption.
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and shows how such uncertainty results in the model having a unique equilibrium.
We depart from the papers in the previous paragraph in that we are not interested in
generating a unique prediction with our model as we do not believe that a model such
as ours can be used to predict the future. Instead of this, our target is to explore the
factors that make different institutions possible after a critical juncture and to understand the
characteristics of these different institutions, without specifying which particular institution
will be selected. This is motivated by the fact that, as Acemoglu and Robinsons’ (2013) put it,
“A critical juncture is a double-edged sword that can cause a sharp turn in the trajectory of a
nation. On the one hand it can open the way for breaking the cycle of extractive institutions
and enable more inclusive ones to emerge. . . Or it can intensify the emergence of extractive
institutions. . . ”. Finally, our worked is also related to that of Bueno de Mesquita (2010),
who studies the role of the vanguard as a tool to inform other players about the likelihood
of a successful revolution and finds that there can be two possible equilibria, one where a
revolution takes place and one where it does not.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model while
we present our main results in Section 3. In Section 4 we discuss our results more in depth
and consider some possible extensions. Finally, Section 5 concludes. All mathematical proofs
are presented in the Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Revolutions: from Elitism to Populism
Assume that time is discrete and given by n = 0, 1, . . .. The society consists of infinitely
many units of land indexed by i ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. In each unit of land i there is one member of
the elite and a peasant. The role of the member of the elite is to set a tax rate tri ∈ [0, 1]
while the role of the peasant is to work the land and pay the elite a percentage tri of the
output.
The output of each unit of land i at any given time period is given by yi ∈ R. The values
of {yi}∞i=1 are independent and identically distributed where for all i we have that yi takes the
normalized value 1 with probability (1− εn) ∈ (0, 1) and the value y ∈ [0, 1] with probability
εn. The random variable εn is independent and identically distributed for all time n with
mean µε ∈ (0, 1) and support [ε, ε] ⊂ (0, 1). The value of εn represents the likelihood of an
output shock at time n while y represents the output in case of a shock. Whenever there is
no ambiguity, we refer to the value of εn at the current period as ε. The peasant works the
land every period by paying a cost c ∈ [0, Ey] where Ey = (1 − µε) + µεy is the expected
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output of each unit of land. Thus, in unit of land i with tax rate tri the payoff of the member
of the elite is given by tri yi and the payoff of the peasant is given by (1− tri )yi − c.
Each unit of land can be considered as a territory but also as, for example, a certain
economic activity or market. The member of the elite of a given unit of land represents
the few agents (or a single agent) that own the unit of land or that are given exclusive
rights to exploit it. The peasant represents all the agents that are responsible for the actual
exploitation of the unit of land.3 They are the ones that have to spend effort and time to
produce a certain output. This output is then split between the two sides, elite and peasant,
according to the tax rate set by the member of the elite. Moreover, at every period and
at every unit of land, an output shock that lowers the output of the unit of land may be
present. The parameter µε captures the long term output gap while the value of ε represents
the current state of the economy. A high value of ε correspond to a recession as output
shocks are frequent whereas a low value of ε represents a period of economic expansion
because output shock are rare. Note that the model can be easily reinterpreted into one
where the tax rate is applied not to output but to profit: if this is the case then c = 0 and yi
represents profit. In Section 4 we explore this case in more detail.
At each time period and with some probability δ ∈ (0, 1) a critical juncture may arrive.
During a critical juncture, and after the current state of the economy ε is known but before
the actual output of each unit of land yi for all i is observed, each member of the elite has a
chance to change the tax rate for his unit of land. All members of the elite choose their tax
rate simultaneously and critical junctures are the only opportunity they have at changing the
tax rate they charge. This is motivated by the fact that the tax rate represents more than
just income tax. The tax rate represents how extractive the current regime in place is, i.e.
institutions. After the new tax rates have been set, the realization of yi for all i is observed
and peasants have a chance to revolt against the regime by simultaneously deciding whether
to join the revolution or not. The interpretation of this is that revolutions do not happen
spontaneously, they are triggered by critical junctures and the way the elite reacts to them.
When the peasant of a given unit of land revolts the output of that unit of land for the
current period is 0 and the peasant does not have to pay the cost c of working the land.
If a fraction x of the peasants revolt then the revolution is successful with probability γ(x)
where γ : [0, 1] → [0, 1]. We assume γ is continuous and weakly increasing with γ(0) = 0
and γ(1) = 1. The assumption about the continuity of γ is made to simplify calculations
but it has no significant impact in the results. Throughout the paper γ is referred to as the
3Although throughout the paper we refer to one member of the elite, one peasant or one citizen, these
terms may encompass more than one person, i.e. a peasant refers to all those who work on a single unit of
land (as, for instance, a family or group of families during feudal times).
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technology of the revolution. The function γ reveals how effective peasants are at revolting
and includes information on, for example, how well armed the rebels are or whether or not
the NATO supports and helps the revolution.
If a revolution is unsuccessful then those peasants that revolted are removed from the
game and replaced with new ones.4 The society then continues to function as before with
the new tax rates set by the elite. If the revolution is successful several things occur: first,
peasants that did not take part in the revolution are removed from the game a replaced with
new ones. Second, the elite is completely removed from the game and all peasants become
citizens. Third, the political regime changes to one where citizens enjoy all the product (and
costs) of the land. After a successful revolution the payoff per period of a citizen working in
unit of land i is yi − c.
Critical junctures are rare significant historical events that may trigger a regime change.
During a critical juncture, the elite has a chance to “update” or “modernize” in order to
retain its power. This takes the form of an opportunity for each member of the elite to
change how extractive institutions are with the peasant, i.e. change the tax rate. After
the elite has responded to the new situation posed by the critical juncture, peasants decide
whether to revolt or not.5 Once a critical juncture and possibly a revolution are resolved, the
society continues to function under the new regime until the next critical juncture. Note that
critical junctures are exogenous occurrences that are not necessarily related to the frequency
of shocks ε. Nevertheless, it could be assumed that critical junctures arrive at any period in
which the frequency of shocks is above or below a certain threshold. This modification of the
model does not affect our results in any way.
When a critical juncture takes place, it is assumed that members of the elite know the
frequency of shocks ε but not which units of land suffer an output shock. We assume that at
a critical juncture, members of the elite know the current state of the economy (expansion,
recession, depression, etc.). Such state is represented in the model by the current value of
ε. However, the elite ignores which specific units of lands (or sectors, markets, etc.) of the
economy will suffer an output shock. Thus, given our assumptions, members of the elite
have to react to the critical juncture knowing the general state of the economy but not the
particular state of each unit of land.
Note that we assume that after a failed revolution all peasants that revolted are removed
4This new peasants could be, for instance, the offspring of the peasants that revolted and failed in their
attempt to change the regime. This is in line with models of evolutionary game theory (see, for instance,
Weibull (1996)) and models with dynasties in Macroeconomics (see, for instance, Bertola et al (2005)
5In our paper we use critical junctures as revision opportunities: a situation that allows players in the
model to change their actions (as opposed to how Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b) use output shocks to solve
the collective action problem).
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from the game and, similarly, if a revolution succeeds then the elite is removed from the
game. We believe this is a realistic assumption as whenever a revolution fails revolutionaries
receive very severe punishments (such as torture and death during the Tibetan unrest in
2008)).6 Similar treatment is given to members of the elite after a successful revolution (from
the beheading of aristocrats during the French revolution to the hanging of dictator Saddam
Hussein). We assume that in case of a successful revolution, peasants that did not join the
revolt are removed from the game. This aims to highlight the loss in private benefits of
not joining a successful revolution. As Tullock (1971) writes: “. . . (revolutionaries) generally
expect to have a good position in the new state which is to be established by the revolution.
Further, . . . (leaders) continuously encourage their followers in such views. In other words,
they hold out private gains to them.”. Alternatively, peasants that do not join the revolution
can be thought of as aligning with the elite and the current regime. Hence, if the revolution
is successful these peasants face the same fate as members of the elite.
Critical junctures are rare and infrequent events that are hard to predict. Thus, we are
interested in situations where the probability of a critical juncture δ is very small. From the
modeling point of view, this means that we look for the limit case when δ tends to zero.
Assume that all agents discount future payoffs at a rate β ∈ (0, 1). Hence, the expected
discounted stream of present and future payoffs (expected payoff hereafter) of the member
of the elite in unit of land i after a critical juncture where the revolution is unsuccessful is
given by
V e(tri ) =
∞∑
n=1
(1− δ)nβn−1triEy + δoe(tri ),
where oe is some function that is bounded below by 0 (in case there is a critical juncture
at some point in the future and the elite is removed from the game), and above by Ey1−β (in
case there is a critical juncture at some point in the future, the elite sets up tax rate tri = 1
and the revolution is unsuccessful). The function oe may include beliefs of what will happen
when the next critical juncture arrives, beliefs about beliefs of what will happen in the next
critical juncture, etc. However, as the purpose is to study the situation when δ → 0, we do
not need to have any knowledge about oe except for the fact that it is bounded above and
below. We can rewrite the function V e as
V e(tri ) = (1− δ)
triEy
1− (1− δ)β + δo
e(tri ),
lim
δ→0
V e(tri ) =
triEy
1− β .
6See the US Department of State report on 2010 Human Rights Report: China
(http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/eap/154382.htm).
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Similarly, after a critical juncture where the revolution is unsuccessful the expected payoff
of the peasant working in unit of land i if he did not revolt is given by
V p(tri ) = (1− δ)
(1− tri )Ey − c
1− (1− δ)β + δo
p(tri ),
lim
δ→0
V p(tri ) =
(1− tri )Ey − c
1− β ,
where the function op belongs to the interval
[
0, Ey1−β
]
and has a similar interpretation to that
of oe.7
If the revolution is successful, the expected payoff of each citizen is given by
V c = (1− δ) Ey − c
1− (1− δ)β + δo
c,
lim
δ→0
V c =
Ey − c
1− β ,
where again the function oc belongs to the interval
[
0, Ey1−β
]
and as a similar interpretation
to that of oe.
The timing of the game at hands is summarized in Figure 1. This figure is not an extensive
form game representation of the model but an illustration of the order at which events take
place in unit of land i. In Figure 1 the status quo refers to a situation where a critical juncture
does not take place and, hence, tax rates do not change and no peasant revolts. In this figure,
NR stands for not revolt while R stands for revolt.
At a critical juncture, and after the elite of a given unit of land i sets up the new tax rate
tri , the expected payoff of the peasant working on unit of land i if a fraction x of the peasants
revolt is given by upi (t
r
i , x) with
u
p
i (t
r
i , x) =
{
(1− tri )yi − c+ β(1− γ(x))V p(tri ) if he does not revolt,
βγ(x)V c if he revolts.
Hence, the peasant working on unit of land i chooses not to revolt if and only if
(1− tri )yi − c− β[γ(x)V c − (1− γ(x))V p(tri )] ≥ 0.
Note that in case a peasant is indifferent between joining the revolution or not we assume he
does not join the revolution. This assumption does not affect our results in any meaningful
way.
Let tr1(x) be the maximum tax rate such that the peasant of a given unit of land does not
join the revolution if a fraction x of the peasants revolt and if there is an output shock in his
7The function op could take the value Ey
1−β
if the peasant becomes a member of the elite in the future. This
is explained in more detail in Section 2.2 when we consider coups.
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Figure 1: Revolutions - Timing of the game for unit of land i
ε
0
NR R
y
NR R
1
1
ε
critical juncture
status quonature
nature
elite i
ε
tri
nature
peasant i peasant i
unit of land. We have that tr1(x) is given implicitly by
(1− tr1(x))y − c− β[γ(x)V c − (1− γ(x))V p(tr1(x))] = 0,
which as δ → 0 can be rewritten as
tr1(x) = 1−
c+ βγ(x)(Ey − 2c)
(1− β)y + β(1− γ(x))Ey . (1)
Similarly, let tr2(x) ≥ tr1(x) be the maximum tax rate that keeps the peasant of a given
unit of land from joining the revolution if a fraction x of the peasants revolt and if there is
no output shock in his unit of land. Then, tr2(x) when δ → 0 is given by:
tr2(x) = 1−
c+ βγ(x)(Ey − 2c)
(1− β) + β(1− γ(x))Ey . (2)
Note that it can happen that either tr1(x) or both t
r
1(x) and t
r
2(x) are negative for a given
value of x. If tr1(x) < 0 then it is not possible for the elite to keep his peasant from revolting
in case of an output shock. If, on top of that, tr2(x) < 0 then the peasant always revolts
regardless of the tax rate set by the member of the elite. Notice that it is never the case that
tr1(x) nor t
r
2(x) are greater than 1 for any x ∈ [0, 1].
At a critical juncture where a fraction x of the peasants revolt the expected payoff of the
member of the elite of a given unit of land i is given by ueNR(t
r
i , x) if his peasant does not
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join the revolution and by ueR(t
r
i , x) if he does:
ueNR(t
r
i , x) = t
r
iEy + β(1− γ(x))V e(tri ),
ueR(t
r
i , x) = β(1− γ(x))V e(tri ).
Note that the superscript i is not needed in the functions ueNR and u
e
R as members of the
elite do not know the realization of output yi when they choose the tax rate.
Thus, if we denote by ue(tri , x) the expected payoff of the member of the elite who owns
unit of land i and by ε the value of εn at the critical juncture we have that
ue(tri , x) =


triEy + β(1− γ(x))V e(tri ) if tri ≤ tr1(x),
tri (1− ε) + β(1− γ(x))V e(tri ) if tri ∈ (tr1(x), tr2(x)],
β(1− γ(x))V e(tri ) otherwise.
(3)
If tri = t
r
1(x) = t
r
2(x) we assume that the member of the elite is in effect choosing tax rate
tr1(x) and, thus, his expected payoff is given by t
r
iEy + β(1 − γ(x))V e(tri ). This assumption
is for consistency with the fact that in case of indifference between revolting or not peasants
prefer not to revolt.
2.2 Coups: from Populism to Elitism
In this section we develop the model for the opposite situation as in the section above: citizens
work the land and at each critical juncture they may stage a coup that could reinstate the
regime where the society is split between the elite and peasants.
Assume that in each unit of land there is a citizen with an expected payoff of V c. When
a critical juncture arrives, citizens decide whether to stage a coup or not after observing the
frequency of shocks ε and the production in each unit of land yi. The timing of the game for
each unit of land i is represented in Figure 2.
If a fraction z ∈ [0, 1] of the citizens stage a coup, let ρ(z) be the probability that the
coup is successful. As with function γ, we assume ρ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] to be continuous and
weakly increasing with ρ(0) = 0 and ρ(1) = 1. The fact that γ and ρ are different functions
is meant to represent that it may be easier to move from one regime to the other than vice
versa.
In line with the assumptions made in the previous section, if a citizen joins a successful
coup then he becomes a member of the elite and a peasant arrives to his unit of land.
Moreover, if a citizen does not join the coup and the coup is successful then he becomes a
peasant and a member of the elite arrives to his unit of land. Finally, citizens that join an
unsuccessful coup are removed from the game and replaced with new ones.
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Figure 2: Coups: Timing of the game for unit of land i
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We remind the reader that although throughout the paper we refer to one member of
the elite, one peasant or one citizen, these terms may encompass more than one person (i.e.
a group of people). Thus, when a coup is successful the regime changes to elitism and a
member of the elite is installed in each unit of land, even in those units of land where the
citizen did not join the coup. This has the interpretation that members of the newly created
elite distribute all units of land amongst themselves. Similarly, when a coup is successful it is
assumed that a peasant arrives to each unit of land where the citizen joined the coup. This
is because in each unit of land there may be members of the society that do not participate
in the economic and political landscape in any way and that they only become relevant from
the modeling point of view when they are turned into peasants.
At a critical juncture where a fraction z of the citizens stage a coup, the expected payoff
of the citizen in unit of land i is given by uci (t
c, z) with
uci (t
c, z) =
{
yi − c+ β [(1− ρ(z))V c + ρ(z)V p(tc)] if he does not join the coup,
βρ(z)V e(tc) if he joins the coup,
where tc is the tax rate implemented after a successful coup. We assume that before the
coup is resolved, the citizens that stage a coup commit to setting up a certain tax rate if
they become members of the elite, and this tax rate is the same in all units of land. This
has the following interpretation: the tax rate represents the institutions in place and, thus,
committing to a tax rate is the equivalent for those that stage the coup to commit to a certain
12
manifesto which lays out the institutions to be put in place after the coup. The case where
the tax rate can vary between different units of land after a successful coup is discussed as
an extension to the main model in Section 4.2.
A citizen does not have incentives to join the coup when δ → 0 if and only if
yi − c+ β
1− β [Ey(1− 2ρ(z)t
c)− c] ≥ 0, (4)
which for ρ(z) > 0 can be rewritten as
tc ≤ (1− β)yi + βEy − c
2ρ(z)βEy
.
Note that in case of indifference a citizen chooses not to join the coup. This assumption is
made simply for analytical convenience and does not affect our results in any meaningful way.
Let tc1(z) be the maximum tax rate such that the citizen of a given unit of land does not
join the coup if a fraction z > 0 of the citizens stage a coup and if there is an output shock
in his unit of land. We have that tc1(z) as δ → 0 is given by
tc1(z) =
(1− β)y + βEy − c
2ρ(z)βEy
. (5)
Similarly, let tc2(z) ≥ tc1(z) be the maximum tax rate such that a citizen does not join the
coup if a fraction z > 0 of the citizens stage a coup and if there is no output shock in his
unit of land. Then, tc2(z) when δ → 0 is given by
tc2(z) =
(1− β) + βEy − c
2ρ(z)βEy
. (6)
If z = 0 then as c ∈ [0, Ey] no citizen that works on a unit of land that does not suffer an
output shock wants to revolt (see equation (4)). However, if yi − c+ β1−β [Ey − c] < 0 then,
even when no other citizen joins the coup, the citizens that work in the units of land that
suffer an output shock have incentives to join the coup. Moreover, it is possible that tc1 < 0,
in which case there is no tax rate that keeps the citizens that work in the units of land that
suffer a production shock from joining the coup. Note that it is always the case that tc2 > 0.
2.3 Equilibrium
In our model, we use Markov Perfect Equilibrium as the equilibrium concept. A Markov
Perfect Equilibrium is a (pure strategy) sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the game that
is played at each critical juncture. At each critical juncture, the state variables are the current
frequency of shocks ε and whether the society is elitist (Section 2.1) or populist (Section 2.2).
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For each possible frequency of shocks, we study what are the possible sub-game perfect Nash
equilibria under each of the two different regimes.
Under the elitist regime, after a critical juncture and after observing ε, each member of the
elite simultaneously chooses a tax rate, the realization of yi for all i is known, and peasants
simultaneously choose whether to revolt or not. Therefore, the Markov Perfect Equilibrium
in this case prescribes a collection of tax rates for the elite and a fraction of the peasants
that revolt such that two conditions are satisfied. First, given the frequency of shocks and
the fraction of the peasants that revolt, no member of the elite has incentives to choose a
different tax rate. Second, given the frequency of shocks, the tax rates set by the elite, the
realization of the value of output in each unit of land and how many peasants revolt, exactly
this fraction of the peasants have incentives to revolt.
Under a populist regime, after a critical juncture and after observing ε and the realization
of yi for all i, citizens simultaneously choose whether to stage a coup or not. Thus, the Markov
Perfect Equilibrium in this case prescribes a fraction of the citizens that stage a coup and a
collection of tax rates such that given the frequency of shocks, the realization of the values of
output, how many citizens stage a coup and the taxes set by the elite in case of a successful
coup, exactly this fraction of the citizens have incentives to stage a coup.
Definition 1. A Markov Perfect Equilibrium is a tuple {({tri }∞i=1, x) , (tc, z)}ε∈[ε,ε] which for
each possible value of ε ∈ [ε, ε] specifies a collection of tax rates {tri }∞i=1 with tri ∈ [0, 1] for
each unit of land i, a fraction of the peasants that revolt x ∈ [0, 1], a tax rate tc ∈ [0, 1] for
all units of land, and a fraction of the citizens that stage a coup z ∈ [0, 1] such that:
1. At a critical juncture, if the society is under elitism and the frequency of shocks is ε:
- Given x, every member of the elite maximizes ue(tri , x) by choosing tax rate t
r
i .
8
- Given tri , yi and x, the peasant working in unit of land i maximizes u
p
i (t
r
i , x) by
choosing whether to join the revolution or not, and the fraction of the peasants
that choose to revolt equals x.
2. At a critical juncture, if the society is under populism and the frequency of shocks is ε:
- Given tc and z, every member of the elite maximizes uci (t
c, z) by choosing whether
to join the coup or not, and the fraction of the citizens that choose to join the coup
equals z.
8Alternatively, given that x is calculated as a best response to {tri }
∞
i=1, every member of the elite maximizes
ue(tri , x) given {t
r
j}j 6=i and peasants’ play the best response to the tax rates set by the elite (i.e. by backwards
induction given {trj}j 6=i). The two statements are equivalent as x does not depend on any individual tax rate
tri because there are infinitely many units of land.
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For the analysis of Markov Perfect Equilibria, we focus on the limit cases where δ → 0.
Thus, in what follows, although not explicitly stated it is always assumed that the value of δ
is taken to zero.
Given the equilibrium definition above, it is useful to separate the analysis of the model
in two parts. The first one (Section 3.1) deals with the first component of the Markov
perfect Equilibrium: the tuple ({tri }∞i=1, x). This is the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium
of the game that is played after a critical juncture where elitism is the current regime. Such
equilibrium does not need to specify the strategies to be played in the critical juncture after
the current one as δ → 0 and β < 1 and, thus, what occurs in the critical juncture after the
current one is payoff irrelevant.
The second part of the analysis (Section 3.2) deals with the second component of the
Markov Perfect Equilibrium: the tuple (tc, z). This is the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium
of the game that is played after a critical juncture where populism is the current regime.
Once again and for the same reasons as in the paragraph above, such equilibrium only needs
to specify the strategies to be played in the current critical juncture.
Effectively, the fact that δ → 0 and β < 1 implies that every critical juncture can be
studied independently of each other. The only thing that connects a critical juncture with
the next one is what is the regime that results after the critical juncture, which is one of the
state variables in our definition of Markov Perfect Equilibrium.
3 Analysis
3.1 Analysis: Revolutions
In this section we analyze the first component of the Markov Perfect Equilibrium. We refer
to the tuples ({tri }∞i=1, x) that are part of a Markov Perfect Equilibrium as r-equilibria. Our
first result states that only four different types of r-equilibria can exist.
Proposition 1. For any value of ε there are at most four possible r-equilibria:
- r-equilibrium 1: ({tr1(0)}∞i=1, 0).
- r-equilibrium 2: ({tr2(ε)}∞i=1, ε).
- r-equilibrium 3: ({tri }∞i=1, x) with x ∈ [0, ε] where a fraction 1 − xε of the elite chooses
tax rate tr1(x) and the rest choose tax rate t
r
2(x), and x is such that
ue(tr1(x), x) = u
e(tr2(x), x).
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- r-equilibrium 4: ({tri }∞i=1, 1) for any {tri }∞i=1.
In r-equilibrium 1 (oppressive regime) we have that all members of the elite choose a tax
rate tr1(0) and no peasant revolts. Thus, in this r-equilibrium the current regime whereby the
peasant works the land and the elite extracts some of the revenue at no cost continues with
probability one after the critical juncture. This regime is observed when all the political and
economy power concentrates on the elite after a critical juncture, as it is currently the case
in military dictatorships in certain Asian countries, where the strength of the elite increased
after the critical juncture caused by the death of Mao Zedong (Acemoglu and Robinson
(2011)).
Under r-equilibrium 2 (unstable regime) we have that the tax rate set up by the elite
is such that only the peasants that suffer an output shock revolt. The probability that the
regime changes is given by γ(ε). Hence, this r-equilibrium leads to a situation where a regime
change is possible. We currently observe this regime in certain countries in Western Asia,
where the Arab Spring that caused fast transitions to democracy in some countries (as in
Tunisia) have left the current regime unstable and in a period of continued civil war (as in
Syria).
The next r-equilibrium, r-equilibrium 3 (segregated regime), is a combination of r-equilibria
1 and 2, where some members of the elite set up tax rate tr1(x) and other set up tax rate
tr2(x). As x ∈ [0, ε] implies tr1(x) ≤ tr2(x), there is segregation between the units of land where
the more extractive tax rate tr2(x) is in place and where some of the peasants revolt, and the
units of land where the less extractive tax rate tr1(x) is in place and where no peasant revolts.
This type of equilibrium was observed after the critical juncture caused by the end of World
War II, where Korea was divided in two countries with different autocratic regimes during
the Korean War. One of these countries then evolved after another critical juncture (the
June Democratic Uprising in 1987, Adesnik and Kim (2008)) and became a full democracy.9
Finally, r-equilibrium 4 (regime change) represents a situation where all peasants revolt.
If all peasants revolt then the elite can do little to stop a revolution as when all peasants
revolt the optimal strategy for a peasant is, under most parameter values, to revolt (Propo-
sition 2 below specifies the parameter values for which this is true). As discussed above,
this equilibrium was observed during the Arab Spring, where Tunisia quickly evolved into a
democracy.
An observation worth mentioning is that everything else equal the higher the fraction of
the peasants that revolt, the lower the r-equilibrium tax rates tr1 and t
r
2. This can be seen
9In the language of the model, the recent history of South Korea can be described by a critical juncture
where r-equilibrium 3 was selected followed by another critical juncture 50 years later where r-equilibrium 4
was selected.
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in equations (1) and (2), which are both decreasing in x. Therefore, a situation where few
peasants revolt represents a more extractive society than a situation where a higher fraction
of the peasants revolt. The explanation for this is that if few peasants revolt, the incentives
for each peasant to revolt are low as the chances of a successful revolution are also low.
Thus, the elite can take advantage of this by charging a higher tax rate. If a high fraction
of the peasants revolt then the revolution is likely to succeed and, hence, if a member of
the elite wants to avoid his peasant from revolting the tax rate he sets has to be relatively
low. The implications of this are intuitive: members of the elite prefer an r-equilibrium
where no peasant revolts and a higher tax rate can be implemented while peasants prefer a
r-equilibrium with a lower tax rate with some social unrest where a regime change is possible.
Our next result shows that there always exists an r-equilibrium and, furthermore, it states
the conditions under which each of the four different r-equilibria are possible. Conditions for
r-equilibria 1-3 to exist are stated implicitly, their explicit forms are presented in the appendix,
where we also present the proof of the proposition.
Proposition 2. For any value of ε there always exists an r-equilibrium. Furthermore, define
∆ue(x) = ue(tr1(x), x)− ue(tr2(x), x)
= tr1(x)εy − (tr2(x)− tr1(x))
[
(1− ε) + (1− γ(x)) βEy
1− β
]
,
we have the following:
1. The tuple ({tr1(0)}∞i=1, 0) is an r-equilibrium if and only if ∆ue(0) ≥ 0.
2. The tuple ({tr2(ε)}∞i=1, ε) is an r-equilibrium if and only if tr2(ε) ≥ 0 and ∆ue(ε) ≤ 0.
3. The tuple ({tri }∞i=1, x) with x ∈ [0, ε] where a fraction 1− xε of the elite chooses tax rate
tr1(x) and the rest choose tax rate t
r
2(x) is an r-equilibrium if and only if ∆u
e(x) = 0.
4. The tuple ({tri }∞i=1, 1) is an r-equilibrium for any {tri }∞i=1 if and only if
β
1− βV
c > 1− c.
Proposition 2 states the conditions under which each of the different r-equilibria are
possible. A crucial function is that of ∆ue(x), which specifies what is the increase in the
expected payoff of a member of the elite from choosing tax rate tr1(x) instead of tax rate t
r
2(x)
when a fraction x of the peasants revolt. Thus, for instance, r-equilibrium ({tr1(0)}∞i=1, 0) is
possible if and only if the increase in expected payoff from choosing tax rate tr1(0) instead of tax
rate tr2(0) when no peasant revolts is positive: i.e. all members of the elite have incentives to
choose tax rate tr1(0) (when all the other members of the elite choose this tax rate) and, hence,
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no peasant has incentives to revolt. The second r-equilibrium, ({tr2(ε)}∞i=1, ε), is possible if
and only if the increase in expected payoff from choosing tax rate tr1(ε) instead of tax rate
tr2(ε) when a fraction ε of the peasants revolt is negative: i.e. all members of the elite have
incentives to choose tax rate tr2(ε) and, hence, only those peasants that work on a unit of land
that suffers an output shock revolt. Finally, if for some x ∈ [0, ε] we have that ∆ue(x) = 0
then when exactly a fraction x of the peasants revolt, members of the elite are indifferent
between setting tax rate tr1(x) and tax rate t
r
2(x). Hence, if a fraction 1− xε of the members
of the elite choose tax rate tr1(x) and the rest choose tax rate t
r
2(x) then exactly a fraction x
of the peasants have incentives to revolt.
As stated by Proposition 2, a necessary but not sufficient condition for r-equilibrium 2 to
exist is that tr2(ε) ≥ 0. This is a requirement as otherwise the elite cannot set up tax rate
tr2(ε) given that tax rates to belong to the interval [0, 1]. As sufficient condition for t
r
2(ε) ≥ 0
is that γ(ε) ≤ 12β (see Lemma 1 in the Appendix).
For most of the rest of this section we shall focus our attention away from r-equilibrium
4 and concentrate on r-equilibria 1-3. Nevertheless, a further discussion on r-equilibrium 4 is
presented at the end of this section. In order to obtain a graphical representation on when
r-equilibria 1-3 are possible, we present Figures 3-5, where the parameter values are set to
β = 0.95, y = 0.8 and µε = 0.2, and ε takes two possible values: εL = 0.05 and εH = 0.25.
In Figures 3 and 4 the cost of working the land is set to c = 0.2 while in Figure 5 this value
is set to c = 0.5. As it can be checked using Lemma 1 in the Appendix, in all three figures it
is true that tr2(ε) ≥ 0. Each figure plots the function ∆ue from Proposition 2 for each of the
two values of ε: ∆ueεk equals function ∆u
e when ε = εk with k ∈ {L,H}.
In Figure 3 we assume that the probability of a revolution to be successful given the
proportion of the peasants that join the revolt is given by γ(x) =
√
x. In Figure 3, we can see
that ∆ueεL(0) < 0, ∆u
e
εL
(εL) < 0 and there is no x ∈ [0, εL] such that ∆ueεL(x) = 0. Hence,
by Proposition 2 the unique r-equilibrium (apart from r-equilibrium 4) is r-equilibrium 2.
If ε = εH then we have that ∆u
e
εH
(0) > 0, ∆ueεH (εH) < 0 and ∆u
e
εH
(x¯) = 0. Hence,
by Proposition 2 we have that r-equilibria 1-3 are possible. In Figure 3 each possible r-
equilibrium is represented by a dot and the arrows point from r-equilibrium 2 when ε = εL
to r-equilibria 1-3 when ε = εH .
Suppose that at a given critical juncture where the current regime is elitism it is true
that ε = εL. Ignoring r-equilibrium 4, this would lead members of the elite to set a tax rate
tr2(εL). Consider now that the elitist regime survives the revolution initiated by a fraction
εL of the peasants. Suppose a new critical juncture arrives and assume that this time the
society is going through a period of economic crisis that makes output shocks more likely:
εH > εL. This new critical juncture can lead to three very distinct situations. Firstly, the
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Figure 3: β = 0.95, y = 0.8, c = 0.2, γ(x) =
√
x, µε = 0.2, εL = 0.05 and εH = 0.25.
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society could move to an r-equilibrium where the tax rate is tr1(0) and such that no peasant
revolts. Secondly, the society could move to an r-equilibrium where tax rate is tr2(εH) and
where the chances of the revolution to be successful are γ(εH) = 50% and, therefore, a regime
change is likely. Thirdly, the society could move to a situation where each unit of land belongs
to either one of two different groups: one where tax rate tr1(x¯) is in place and as such no
peasant revolts, and another one where tax rate tr2(x¯) is in place and where a fraction εH of
the peasants revolts.
Hence, the arrival of a critical juncture when the frequency of shocks increases creates
different alternatives in the possible history that the society could follow. The critical juncture
may lead to a more extractive and repressing regime where no peasant revolts, to a more
inclusive environment where regime change is likely, or to segregation between the different
units of land. In this respect, our model illustrates Acemoglu and Robinsons’ (2013) statement
that “A critical juncture is a double-edged sword that can cause a sharp turn in the trajectory
of a nation. On the one hand it can open the way for breaking the cycle of extractive
institutions and enable more inclusive ones to emerge. . . Or it can intensify the emergence of
extractive institutions. . . ”.
The reason why the frequency of shocks affects the r-equilibria that are possible in this
case is the following. During times of expansion (εL), if a member of the elite charges the high
tax rate tr2 then the probability that his peasant revolts is small given that output shocks are
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infrequent. Hence, members of the elite are better off by charging a high tax rate and having
the risk that their peasant revolts than by charging a smaller tax rate that ensures that their
peasant does not revolt. On the other hand, during times of economic crisis (εH), members
of the elite would like to set up a tax rate so that no peasant revolts (r-equilibrium 1) as the
number of the peasants that could revolt in this case is more significant and, hence, a regime
change would be likely. However, if peasants coordinate and many of them revolt then the
elite can only stop from revolting those that do not suffer an output shock (r-equilibrium 2).
An intermediate case also exists where in some units of land no peasant revolts and in some
others a fraction of the peasants revolt (r-equilibrium 3).
Figure 4 represents the same situation as Figure 3 when instead γ(x) = x. As x ≤ √x
for all x ∈ [0, 1], a successful revolution is harder to achieve compared to the case depicted
in Figure 3. As we can see in Figure 4 , if ε = εL then the unique r-equilibrium (apart from
r-equilibrium 4) is again r-equilibrium 2, where a fraction εL of the peasants revolt and the
tax rate is set to tr2(εL). However, if ε = εH then only r-equilibrium 1 is possible among
r-equilibria 1-3. Hence, the fact that a successful revolution is harder to achieve combined
with a period of recession suggests that at a critical juncture the society could move to more
extractive institutions where no peasant revolts.
Figure 4: β = 0.95, y = 0.8, c = 0.2, γ(x) = x, µε = 0.2, εL = 0.05 and εH = 0.25.
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Comparing Figures 3 and 4 we can deduce that if a successful revolution is harder to
achieve then peasants are less likely to revolt and over-rule the elite. That is, a less effective
technology of the revolution leads to a decrease in the likelihood that the regime changes.
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This is true not only because those peasants that revolt are less effective at doing so, but also
because less peasants have incentives to join the revolution.
Figure 5 plots the same situation as Figure 3 when instead the cost of working the land is
given by c = 0.5. As we can observe, there is a unique r-equilibrium (except for r-equilibrium
4) given by ({tr2(ε)}, ε). Hence, with respect to Figure 3, increasing the cost of working the
land implies that the r-equilibrium where no peasant revolts is less likely to be present. This
is intuitive as if c increases then peasants enjoy less benefit from the land and, hence, are
more likely to revolt as the potential loss if the revolution is unsuccessful is lower. This also
suggests that societies that enjoy lower land profitability (Ey− c) are less prone to equilibria
multiplicity as r-equilibria 1 and 3 are less likely to be present.
Figure 5: β = 0.95, y = 0.8, c = 0.5, γ(x) =
√
x, µε = 0.2, εL = 0.05 and εH = 0.25.
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In all three figures above we have ignored r-equilibrium 4, which is the equilibrium where
all peasants revolt. Proposition 2 states that r-equilibrium 4 is possible if and only if β1−βV
c >
1−c, a condition that is satisfied for most sensible parameter values. For example, if β = 0.95
then r-equilibrium 4 is possible unless land profitability, Ey−c, is more than 380 times smaller
than the maximum profit of a unit of land, 1 − c. The reasons we have chosen to focus on
r-equilibrium 4 is that this equilibrium is present in all the graphs plotted above. This is not
surprising, however, if all peasants revolt then the revolution is successful and, hence, every
single peasant wants to revolt.10
10Unless his discount factor is such that he prefers the one-off payoff from working the land today instead
21
A question that may arise is that of whether or not it is possible for r-equilibrium 4 to be
the unique equilibrium. Our next result states that this is a possibility:
Proposition 3. If (1− β)y + βEy < c then r-equilibrium 4 is the unique equilibrium.
If r-equilibrium 4 is the unique equilibrium then the regime change happens with proba-
bility one and the society turns to a populist regime where the population consists of citizens.
3.2 Analysis: Coups
In this section we analyze the second component of the Markov Perfect Equilibrium. We
refer to the tuples ({tci}∞i=1, z) that are part of a Markov Perfect Equilibrium as c-equilibria.
The next result characterizes the set of c-equilibira and states the conditions under which
each of the possible c-equilibria can be present.
Proposition 4. For any value of ε there always exists a c-equilibrium and there are at most
three possible c-equilibria:
- c-equilibrium 1: ({tc}∞i=1, 0) for any tc ∈ [0, 1]. This c-equilibrium exists if and only if
(1− β)y + βEy − c ≥ 0.
- c-equilibrium 2: ({tc}∞i=1, ε) for any tc ∈ (tc1(ε), tc2(ε)]. This c-equilibrium exists if and
only if
(1− β)y + β(1− 2ρ(ε))Ey − c < 0.
- c-equilibrium 3: ({tc}∞i=1, 1) for any tc > tc2(1). This c-equilibrium exists if and only if
(1− β)− βEy − c < 0.
In c-equilibrium 1 (stable democracy) we have that no citizen attempts a coup and the
society continues to function under the populist regime after the critical juncture with prob-
ability one.11 In this situation, citizens do not have incentives to stage a coup for one main
reason: no other citizen joins the coup. c-equilibrium 1 is not possible if y−c+ β1−β [Ey−c] < 0
or, in other words, if the expected payoff of a citizen who works on a unit of land that suffers
a production shock is negative. In this case, each citizen working on a unit of land that suffers
an output shock would be better off staging a coup even if he is the only citizen doing so. This
of the future stream of payoffs from eliminating the elite and becoming a citizen.
11Note that although we make use of the term democracy the model has no democratic process built in.
We chose this name given that under populism there is no elite and all citizens are the same.
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woulds imply that all citizens that suffer an output shock stage a coup, which contradicts the
fact that in a c-equilibrium 1 no citizen stages a coup.
The behavior of most democracies in the western world fall into this type of equilibrium.
After a critical juncture, like the financial crisis in 2008, the country continues to function
as a democracy. The role of a financial crisis in the institutions in a democratic regime is
discussed further after we describe c-equilibrium 2 and c-equilibrium 3.
The second c-equilibrium, c-equilibrium 2 (unstable democracy), is such that those cit-
izens that work on a unit of land that suffers an output shock join the coup. In this case,
the tax rate to be set by the future elite is such that only a fraction of the citizens want
to stage a coup. The coup is successful at changing the current regime back to elitism with
a probability of ρ(ε). This type of equilibrium is observed in democratic countries where a
critical juncture has caused a civil war, like the civil war that started in South Sudan in 2013
after a former minister was removed from his duties and staged a coup.12
Finally, in c-equilibrium 3 (regime change) citizens from all units of land join the coup
and a regime change happens with probability 1. The regime change implies that from next
period on the society is back elitism. This equilibrium is present for most sensible parameter
values because if all citizens join the coup then the coup will succeed with probability one.13
Hence, the only factor that may stop a citizen from joining the coup is a very low discount
factor β, so that the cost of not having any output today is greater than the future benefits
of joining the elite. The fact that c-equilibrium 3 is a possibility for most sensible parameter
values should not be surprising and has a very natural interpretation: even in the most robust
democracies in the developed world, if all politically active people coordinate to change the
regime there will be a regime change.
Proposition 4 also implies the following. Suppose that a severe economic crisis causes a
critical juncture. In the language of the model, the fact that the economic crisis is severe
implies that ε is high, which in turn implies that Ey is low. This makes c-equilibrium 1 less
likely and c-equilibrium 3 more likely. However, whether c-equilibrium 2 is more or less likely
depends on how likely the coup is to succeed given the number of citizens that join the coup
(function ρ).
In order to get a better understanding of the result in Proposition 4, define the functions
∆t1(ε) = (1 − β)y + β(1 − 2ρ(ε))Ey − c and ∆t2 = (1 − β) − βEy − c. Thus, according to
12See, for instance, http://www.aljazeera.com/video/africa/2013/07/20137287019670555.html and
http://www.trust.org/item/20131223195244-2j16n/?source=hptop#.
13With regard to the interpretation of the model, note that all citizens joining the coup means that in every
unit of land all those who are politically active attempt a regime change to turn the rest (politically inactive
people) into peasants.
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Proposition 4, c-equilibrium 1 is possible if and only if ∆t1(0) ≥ 0, c-equilibrium 2 is possible
if and only if ∆t1(ε) < 0 and, finally, c-equilibrium 3 is possible if and only if ∆t2 < 0. Figure
6 below depicts the functions ∆t1 and ∆t2 where in the top graph we set ρ(z) =
√
z and in
the bottom graph we set ρ(z) = z. Both figures use the same parameter values as Figures 3
and 4.
Figure 6: β = 0.95, y = 0.8, c = 0.2, ρ(x) =
√
x (top), ρ(x) = x (bottom), µε = 0.25.
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Both plots in Figure 6 depict a similar situation: c-equilibrium 1 and c-equilibrium 3 are
both possible while c-equilibrium 2 is possible if and only if ε is high enough at the critical
juncture. The difference between the plot at the top of the figure and the plot at the bottom
is that the infimum value of ε for which c-equilibrium 2 is possible (referred to as z in the
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graph) is lower under the function ρ =
√
z (top) than under the function ρ(z) (bottom).
That is, c-equilibrium 2 is more likely to exist under the function ρ =
√
z than under the
function ρ = z. The interpretation of this is that if a coup is easier to succeed given how
many citizens join it, then ceteris paribus citizens have more incentives to join the coup. In
c-equilibrium 2 not all citizens want to join the coup because although the are some chances
that the coup is successful, there is still the possibility that the coup fails. Thus, when the
citizens that work on a unit of land that does not suffer an output shock decide whether to
join the coup or not, the fact that the coup may fail makes them not to want to join the
coup. The citizens that work on a unit of land that suffers and output shock have less to lose
(lower opportunity cost from joining the coup) and, hence, the fact that the coup has some
chances of succeeding means that they have enough incentives to join the coup.
The function ρ is interpreted as how likely a coup is to succeed given how many citizens
join it. Therefore, just as it is the case with function γ, the function ρ could have information
on how armed those that stage a coup are or whether or not those that stage the coup
receive any type of external support from other countries or organizations (funds, food, use
of military equipment, etc.). As it was the case with function γ in the previous section,
we observe a significant role played by the function that represents how likely a coup is to
succeed.
3.3 Example of a Markov Perfect Equilibrium
In sections 3.1 and 3.2 we have studied each of the two components of all possible Markov
Perfect Equilibria separately. In this section we present an example of a full description of a
Markov Perfect Equilibrium using the parameter values that we have used in Figures 3 and
6.
Example. Assume that β = 0.95, y = 0.8, c = 0.2, γ(x) =
√
x, ρ(x) =
√
x, µε = 0.2,
ε = 0.1 and ε = 0.3. A Markov Perfect Equilibrium is given by:
{({tri }∞i=1, x) , (tc, z)}ε =
{
{({tr2(ε)}∞i=1, ε) , (tc, 0)}ε if ε ∈ [ε, µε],
{({tri }∞i=1, 1) , (tc, ε)}ε if ε ∈ (µε, ε],
for any {tri }∞i=1 with tri ∈ [0, 1] for all i and any tc > tc2(1).
In the example above we have that under the elitist regime, if a critical juncture arrives
and the economy is going through a period of expansion (ε ≤ µε) then only a few peasants
revolt. If, however, the economy is going through a period of contraction (ε > µε) then
all peasants revolt and a regime change happens with probability one. On the other hand,
if the current regime is populism and a critical juncture arrives during a time of economic
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expansion, no citizen will stage a coup and populism will continue with probability one.
Finally, under populism, if a critical juncture arrives and the economy is going through a
period of contraction then a few citizens will stage a coup and try to reinstate the elitist
regime. This example illustrates how the society could transition between regimes depending
on the current circumstances at the time the critical juncture arrives.
Note that the outcome of a critical juncture can have long lasting effects, spanning several
future critical junctures. In the example above, suppose that the initial regime is elitism. If
at the first critical juncture the economy is going through a period of recession, the regime
changes to populism. Such populist regime could survive for many future critical junctures,
provided that conditions during future critical junctures are appropriate. If, on the other
hand, during the first critical juncture the economy is going through a period of expansion
and the few that join the revolution fail at changing the regime, the elitist regime could
itself survive for many future critical junctures. This illustrates the phenomenon of path
dependence; as Skocpol and Pierson (2002) put it, “outcomes at a critical juncture trigger
feedback mechanisms that reinforce the recurrence of a particular pattern into the future
. . . once actors have ventured far down a particular path, they are likely to find it very
difficult to reverse course”.14 In our model, the feedback mechanism Skocpol and Pierson
(2002) refer to is the current regime at the critical juncture.
Note that the Markov Perfect Equilibrium above is simply an example, as for the pa-
rameter values used there is not a unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium. The purpose of this
paper is not to predict the outcome of a critical juncture but to understand the different
possible scenarios that could arise after a critical juncture and to improve our knowledge of
the intuition behind each of these different possibilities, as well as to study how the society
can transition between different regimes.
Given the nature of the Markov Perfect Equilibrium and the fact that the current value of
ε is a state variable, for each value of ε the Markov Perfect Equilibrium specifies a unique r-
equilibrium and a unique c-equilibrium. It could be that at two different critical junctures the
society evolves differently depending on the equilibrium it selects even if both state variables
(ε and current regime) are the same. We do not explicitly allow for this possibility but the
model presented here is rich enough to accommodate for this alternative: one simply has to
look at what are the possible r-equilibria and c-equilibria for the different values of ε.
14For more information on the relationship between critical junctures and path dependence see Stockpol
(2000).
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4 Discussion
4.1 Tax on Profits: c = 0
A particular case of our model is the situation where c = 0. If c = 0 the model can be
reinterpreted as one where yi is not output but the profit of each unit of land i. A salient
feature of the model when c = 0 is that the equilibria where no peasant revolts and no citizen
joins the coup are always possible. This is our next result:
Proposition 5. If c = 0 then the tuple ({tr1(0)}, 0) is always a r-equilibrium and the tuple
({tc}∞i=1, 0) is always an c-equilibrium.
The intuition for the result above when the current regime is elitism is that if c = 0 then
the elite can always set up a tax rate such that no peasant wants to revolt. Consider the
extreme situation where the member of the elite in unit of land i sets up a tax rate tri = 1. In
this case, when no peasant revolts then the peasant working in unit of land i does not have
incentives to revolt as if he does then he obtains an expected payoff of zero (the revolution
fails for sure), while if he does not revolt then he also gets an expected payoff of zero per
period (the elite extracts all his surplus). When c > 0 if the output in case of a shock is lower
than the cost of working the land, y < c, and the peasant is impatient enough, low β, the
peasant is better off joining the revolution even if no other peasant revolts: the revolution
fails for sure but the peasant who revolts guarantees himself an expected payoff of zero, which
is better than a negative payoff.
If the current regime is populism, the fact that c = 0 implies that the expected payoff of
a citizen is always strictly positive and, hence, if no other citizen joins the coup then staging
a coup gives the citizen an expected payoff of zero, as the coup fails for sure. Thus, c = 0
implies that when no citizen joins the coup then no other citizen has incentives to stage a
coup regardless of the other parameters of the model.
Note that, as already discussed, the fact that no peasant revolts does not mean that the
profit of each unit of land is distributed equally between the elite and the peasant. As a
matter of fact, when c = 0 the equilibrium where no peasant revolts is such that the elite
sets up a tax rate as extractive as possible (tr1(0) = 1). This is because the elite no longer
has to compensate the peasant for the costs of exploiting the land as the tax is applied to
profit, not just to output.
27
4.2 Different Tax Rates after a Coup
In this section we relax the assumption by which all citizens that stage a coup commit to the
same tax rate. In particular, we now consider the possibility of setting up different tax rates
for each unit of land after a successful coup.
If we denote by tci the tax rate set up in unit of land i in case of a successful coup we have
that a citizen does not have incentives to join the coup when δ → 0 if and only if
yi − c+ β
1− β [Ey(1− 2ρ(z)t
c
i )− c] ≥ 0,
which for ρ(z) > 0 can be rewritten as
tci ≤
(1− β)yi + βEy − c
2ρ(z)βEy
.
In order to accommodate for the fact that different tax rates are allowed after a successful
coup, we modify the definition of a Markov Perfect Equilibrium as follows:
Definition 2. A Markov Perfect Equilibrium with different tax rates after a coup is a tuple
{({tri }∞i=1, x) , ({tci}∞i=1, z)}ε which for each possible value of ε ∈ [ε, ε] specifies a collection of
tax rates {tri }∞i=1 with tri ∈ [0, 1] for each unit of land i, a fraction of the peasants that revolt
x ∈ [0, 1], a collection of tax rates {tci}∞i=1 with tci ∈ [0, 1] for each unit of land i, and a fraction
of the citizens that stage a coup z ∈ [0, 1] such that:
1. At a critical juncture, if the society is under elitism and the frequency of shocks is ε:
- Given x, every member of the elite maximizes ue(tri , x) by choosing tax rate t
r
i .
- Given tri , yi and x, the peasant working in unit of land i maximizes u
p
i (t
r
i , x) by
choosing whether to join the revolution or not, and the fraction of the peasants
that choose to revolt equals x.
2. At a critical juncture, if the society is under populism and the frequency of shocks is ε:
- Given {tci}∞i=1 and z, every member of the elite maximizes uci (tci , z) by choosing
whether to join the coup or not, and the fraction of the citizens that choose to join
the coup equals z.
As in the previous section, a c-equilibrium refers to the second component of a Markov
Perfect Equilibrium: the tuple ({tci}∞i=1, z). We have the following result:
Proposition 6. For all z ∈ [0, 1] there exists a collection of tax rates {tci}∞i=1 such that
({tci}∞i=1, z) is a c-equilibrium.
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The result in Proposition 6 states that for any possible fraction of the citizens that join
the coup, we can construct a c-equilibrium where exactly this fraction of the citizens have
incentives to join the coup. The intuition is that for every unit of land and fraction of the
citizens that join the coup z, there is a tax rate above which a citizen has incentives to join
the coup and below which a citizen does not have incentives to join the coup. Thus, by
choosing the right collection of tax rates {tci}∞i=1 a c-equilibrium can be constructed such that
the fraction of the citizens that join the coup is as desired. The result in Proposition 6 is as
expected: by choosing different tax rates we are effectively manipulating the expected payoff
of each citizen when he chooses to join the coup. Hence, we can choose tax rates such that
each citizen behaves a we require.
We believe that a situation where each citizen that joins the coup is allowed to choose a
different tax rate if the coup is successful is less realistic than a situation where all citizens
that stage a coup commit to a unique tax rate. As discussed before, the tax rate represents
the institutions in place and, hence, it can be viewed as the manifesto of the coup. As a
result, those that join the coup explicitly adhere to such manifesto by committing to setting
up a common tax rate in case the coup is successful.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we studied regime change in the presence of critical junctures and established
what are the different types of institutions that could emerge after a critical juncture. We
completed our analysis by looking at various examples that illustrated how different factors,
such as frequency of output shocks, affect the possible outcomes after a critical juncture.
In our results, we used the different equilibria that may arise in the model to explain
different institutional settings that have appeared at various points in time in the history of
civilizations. On top of that, we have used several current and historical examples to illustrate
how each of the different equilibria of the model matches the different institutions observed
in different countries. As opposed to previous literature, we have explicitly considered the
cooperation/coordination problem faced by peasants in the presence of an elite. This lead to
a richer set of possible equilibria and allowed us to characterize a wide variety of institutions.
For instance, we found that an equilibrium where some but not all peasants revolt is possible,
and an equilibrium where there is segregation, are both possible. We have deliberately left
open the question of which of the specific equilibria is selected because we do believe such
equilibrium selection depends of minor institutional differences not modeled here (also know
as institutional drift, see Acemoglu and Robinson (2011)).
In this paper we have focused on what happens after a critical juncture arrives. Future
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work could look at the causes of a critical juncture and how these came to exists, or to study
empirically the various variables that contribute to the appearance of a critical juncture.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Any r-equilibrium ({tri }∞i=1, x) where x is such that tr2(x) < 0 must
have x = 1, as if x peasants revolt and tr2(x) < 0 then all peasants have incentives to revolt
regardless of the tax rate set by members of the elite (see equation (2)). Thus, in r-equilibrium
either ({tri }∞i=1, 1) with tr2(1) < 0 or ({tri }∞i=1, x) with tr2(x) ≥ 0.
If tr2(1) < 0 and all peasants revolt then the tax rates set by the elite {tri }∞i=1 are irrelevant
as there is no tax rate that will keep a peasant from revolting. Furthermore, if x = 1 and
tr2(1) < 1 then all peasants have incentives to revolt regardless of the tax rate. This is
r-equilibrium 4, ({tri }∞i=1, 1), in the proposition.
Consider r-equilibria ({tri }∞i=1, x) with tr2(x) ≥ 0. If tr1(x) < 0 then it must be that all
members of the elite set a tax rate equal to tr2(x) (as it can be deduced from equation (3),
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ue(tri , x) has a maximum in t
r
2(x) whenever t
r
2(x) ≥ 0 and tr1(x) < 0). If all members of the
elite choose tax rate tr2(x) and x > ε then there are peasants that revolt even though their
land did not suffer an output shock. If this is true then it must be that all peasants revolt;
this leads to the only possibility of ({tr2(1)}∞i=1, 1), which is a particular case of r-equilibrium
4. If, on the other hand, x < ε, then there are peasants that do not revolt even though their
land suffered an output shock, a contradiction to the definition of tr2(x). Thus, if all members
of the elite set up tax rate tr2(x) then the only possibility is x = ε so that the chosen tax rate
is given by tr2(ε). This is r-equilibrium 2 in the proposition.
Consider now r-equilibria ({tri }∞i=1, x) with tr1(x) ≥ 0. We have that members of the elite
either set a tax rate equal to tr1(x) or to t
r
2(x). This can be seen easily by looking at equation
(3) and noting that ue(tri , x) has a maximum in either t
r
1(x) or t
r
2(x) whenever t
r
1(x) ≥ 0. We
have now three possibilities: all members of the elite choose tax rate tr1(x), all choose t
r
2(x),
or some choose tr1(x) and others choose t
r
2(x). We have already dealt with the case where all
members of the elite set tax rate tr2(x) in the paragraph above. Thus, we focus now on the
situations where either all members of the elite choose tax rate tr1(x), or some choose t
r
1(x)
and others choose tr2(x).
In any r-equilibrium ({tr1(x)}∞i=1, x) it must be that x = 0 as if x > 0 and all members of
the elite set up tax rate tr1(x) then when a fraction x of the peasants revolt, by the definition
of tr1(x) in equation (1) no peasant has incentives to revolt, which represents a contradiction
to the fact that x > 0. Thus, the only possibility is that ({tr1(0)}∞i=1, 0), which is r-equilibrium
1 in the proposition.
Finally, consider any r-equilibrium ({tri }∞i=1, x) where some members of the elite choose
tr1(x) and others choose t
r
2(x). Then it must be that exactly a fraction 1− xε of the members
of the elite choose tax rate tr1(x) and a fraction
x
ε
choose tax rate tr2(x). Otherwise, if fraction
δ 6= x
ε
of the members of the elite choose tax rate tr2(x) then a proportion δε 6= x of the
peasants choose to revolt (those peasants working on a unit of land subject to tax rate
tr2(x) and where there is an output shock). This represents a contradiction to the fact that
({tri }∞i=1, x) is an r-equilibrium. Thus, the only possibility is that ({tri }∞i=1, x) where a fraction
1 − x
ε
of the members of the elite choose tax rate tr1(x) and the rest choose tax rate t
r
2(x).
This is r-equilibrium 3 in the proposition, which is only possible if x ≤ ε and no member
of the elite that chooses tax rate tr1(x) wants to choose tax rate t
r
2(x) and vice-versa, i.e.
ue(tr1(x), x) = u
e(tr2(x), x).
Proof of Proposition 2. We prove the result separately for each of the different r-equilibria
and then prove that at least one of them is always present.
1. ({tr1(0)}∞i=1, 0):
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From equation (2), we have that
(1− tr1(0))y − c =
(1− tr1(0))Ey − c
1− β
Hence, if tr1(0) = 0 then the right hand side of the equation above is greater than the
left hand side, while if tr1(0) = 1 then the opposite occurs. Thus, since the expression
above is continuous in tr1(0), by Bolzano’s Theorem we have that t
r
1(0) ∈ [0, 1].
The tuple ({tr1(0)}∞i=1, 0) is an r-equilibrium if both no peasant wants to revolt and no
member of the elite wants to set up tax rate tr2(0). By definition, if a fraction 0 of the
peasants revolt then tr1(0) is such that no peasant wants to revolt.
Moreover, no member of the elite wants to set up tax rate tr2(0) if and only if u
e(tr1(0), 0) ≥
ue(tr2(0), 0). This can be rewritten as ∆u
e(0) ≥ 0. The explicit functional form for this
condition ∆ue(0) ≥ 0 is
1− c+ βγ(0)(Ey − 2c)
(1− β)y + β(1− γ(0))Eyεy −
(
c+ βγ(0)(Ey − 2c)
(1− β)y + β(1− γ(0))Ey −
c+ βγ(0)(Ey − 2c)
(1− β) + β(1− γ(0))Ey
)
[
(1− ε) + (1− γ(0)) βEy
1− β
]
≥ 0.
2. ({tr2(ε)}∞i=1, ε):
Firstly, it must be that tr2(ε) ≥ 0 as otherwise the elite is not able to set up tax rate
tr2(ε). The tuple ({tr2(ε)}∞i=1, ε) is an r-equilibrium if both no peasant wants to revolt
and no member of the elite wants to set up tax rate tr1(ε). By definition, if a fraction ε
of the peasants revolt then tr2(ε) is such that only those peasant who suffer an output
shock revolt, i.e. a fraction ε of the peasants want to revolt.
Moreover, no member of the elite wants to set up tax rate tr1(ε) if and only if u
e(tr2(ε), ε) ≥
ue(tr1(ε), ε). This can be rewritten as ∆u
e(ε) ≤ 0. The explicit functional form for this
condition is
1− c+ βγ(ε)(Ey − 2c)
(1− β)y + β(1− γ(ε))Eyεy −
(
c+ βγ(ε)(Ey − 2c)
(1− β)y + β(1− γ(ε))Ey −
c+ βγ(ε)(Ey − 2c)
(1− β) + β(1− γ(ε))Ey
)
[
(1− ε) + (1− γ(ε)) βEy
1− β
]
≤ 0.
3. ({tri }∞i=1, x) where a fraction 1− xε of the elite chooses tax rate tr1(x) and the rest choose
tax rate tr2(x):
By definition, if a fraction x of the peasants revolt then tr1(x) and t
r
2(x) are such that
no peasant on a unit of land where the tax rate is tr1(x) wants to revolt and only those
peasants that work on a unit of land where the tax rate is tr2(x) and that suffer an
output shock revolt. Thus, since a fraction x
ε
of the members of the elite set up tax
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rate tr2(x) and a fraction ε of those have their peasants revolt, we have that a fraction
x of the peasants revolt, as required.
Moreover, no member of the elite wants to set up a tax rate different from the one he
is currently setting if and only if ue(tr1(x), x) = u
e(tr2(x), x), which can be rewritten as
∆ue(x) = 0. The explicit functional form for this condition is
1− c+ βγ(x)(Ey − 2c)
(1− β)y + β(1− γ(x))Eyεy −
(
c+ βγ(x)(Ey − 2c)
(1− β)y + β(1− γ(x))Ey −
c+ βγ(x)(Ey − 2c)
(1− β) + β(1− γ(x))Ey
)
[
(1− ε) + (1− γ(x)) βEy
1− β
]
= 0.
Finally, we must show that both tr1(x) and t
r
2(x) are positive as otherwise this r-
equilibrium is not possible. If x is such that ue(tr1(x), x) = u
e(tr2(x), x) then it must be
that
εtr1(x)y = (1− ε)(tr2(x)− tr1(x)) + β(1− γ(x))[V e(tr2(x)− V e(tr1(x))].
Since tr1(x) ≤ tr2(x) for all x ∈ [0, 1] implies V e(tr2(x)) − V e(tr1(x)) ≥ 0 then it is true
that (1− ε)(tr2(x)− tr1(x)) + β(1− γ(x))[V e(tr2(x)− V e(tr1(x))] ≥ 0 for all x and, hence,
εtr1(x)y ≥ 0. This implies that tr1(x) ≥ 0 and, as tr1(x) ≤ tr2(x), it is also true that
tr2(x) ≥ 0 as required.
4. ({tri }∞i=1, 1) is an r-equilibrium for any {tri }∞i=1:
From the proof of Proposition 1, the tuple ({tri }∞i=1, 1) is an r-equilibrium for any {tri }∞i=1
if and only if tr2(1) < 0. Hence, the definition of V
c and equation (2) when x = 1 together
with the fact that γ(1) = 1 leads to the desired result.
For the proof that at least one the four possible r-equilibria is always present, consider
first the case where tr2(ε) < 0. In this situation, we have that if ε peasants revolt then all
peasants revolt as no tax rate can keep a peasant from revolting. Hence, since for any given
tax rate the incentives to revolt are increasing in the number of peasants that revolt, tr2(ε) < 0
implies that if all peasants revolt then all peasants have incentives to revolt and the elite can
do nothing to stop peasants from revolting. This means that if tr2(ε) < 0 then r-equilibrium
4 exists.
Consider now the case with tr2(ε) ≥ 0. If tr1(ε) < 0 then ({tr2(ε), ε}) is an r-equilibrium as
if ε peasants revolt members of the elite maximize their expected payoff by choosing tr2(ε).
If tr2(ε) ≥ 0 and tr1(ε) ≥ 0 and neither ({tr1(0), 0}) nor ({tr2(ε), ε}) are r-equilibria it must
be because ∆ue(0) < 0 and ∆ue(ε) > 0 (see the first part of the proof). However, since
the function ∆ue(x) is continuous, by Bolzano’s Theorem there exists a x¯ ∈ (0, ε) such that
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∆ue(x¯) = 0. Moreover, since tr1(ε) ≥ 0 and tr2(ε) ≥ 0 and both tr1(x) and tr2(x) are decreasing
functions in their argument (see equations (1) and (2) and recall that γ is an increasing
function), then for all x ≤ ε it must be that tr1(x) ≥ 0 and tr2(x) ≥ 0. In particular, tr1(x¯) ≥ 0
and tr2(x¯) ≥ 0. Thus, the tuple ({tri }∞i=1, x¯) where a fraction 1 − x¯ε of the elite chooses tax
rate tr1(x¯) and the rest choose tax rate t
r
2(x¯) is an r-equilibrium.
Lemma 1. A sufficient condition for tr2(ε) ≥ 0 is that γ(ε) ≤ 12β .
Proof of Lemma 1. Using equation (2) we have that tr2(ε) ≥ 0 if and only if
(1− 2βγ(ε))(Ey − c) ≥ −(1− β)(1− Ey).
Thus, as Ey − c ≥ 0 and 1 − Ey ≥ 0 a sufficient condition for the inequality above to be
satisfied is that 1− 2βγ(ε) ≥ 0, which leads to the condition in the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 3. r-equilibria 1-3 do not exists if tr2(0) < 0 as in this case t
r
1(x) ≤
tr2(x) < 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1] and the elite cannot set up tax rates tr1(x) or tr2(x) for any
x ∈ [0, 1]. Using equation (2) we have that tr2(0) < 0 if and only if
y + β(Ey − y) < c.
Combining the fact that an r-equilibrium always exists (Proposition 2) with the inequality
above gives the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 4. First note that if a citizen working on a unit of land that does not
suffer an output shock has incentives to join the coup then all citizens have incentives to join
the coup. On the one hand, the citizens that work on a unit of land that does not suffer an
output shock have incentives to join the coup as they are all the same and, hence, if one of
them has incentives to join the coup then all of them have incentives to join the coup. On
the other hand, the citizens that work on a unit of land that suffers an output shock have
always more incentives to join the coup than a citizen working on a unit of land that does
not suffer an output shock (see equation (4)).
Similarly, if a citizen working on a unit of land that suffers an output shock does not have
incentives to join the coup then no citizen has incentives to join the coup. On the one hand,
the citizens that work on a unit of land that suffers an output shock do not have incentives
to join the coup as they are all the same and, hence, if one of them does not have incentives
to join the coup then none of them has incentives to join the coup. On the other hand, the
citizens that work on a unit of land that does not suffer an output shock have always less
incentives to join the coup than a citizen working on a unit of land that suffers an output
shock (see equation (4)).
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Any c-equilibrium (tc, 0) must be such that tc ≤ tc1(0) as otherwise when no citizen joins
the coup then all citizens that suffer an output shock have incentives to join the coup and,
hence, at least a fraction ε of the citizens join the coup, a contradiction. Since tc ≤ tc1(0) if
and only if tc1(0) ≥ 0, this c-equilibrium is possible if and only if (1− β)y+ βEy− c ≥ 0 (see
equation (4)).
In any c-equilibrium (tc, z) where z ∈ (0, 1) it must be that z = ε as if z > ε then there
are citizens working on a unit of land that does not suffer an output shock that decide to
join the coup. This means that all citizens have incentives to join the coup as argued above
and, therefore, we must have that z = 1, a contradiction. Similarly, if z < ε then there are
citizens working on a unit of land that suffers an output shock that decide not to join the
coup. As discussed above, this implies that no citizen has incentives to join the coup and,
therefore, we must have that z = 0, a contradiction.
Moreover, any c-equilibrium (tc, ε) must have tc ∈ (tc1(ε), tc2(ε)]. Otherwise, if tc > tc2(ε)
then when a fraction ε of the citizens join the coup we have that all citizens have incentives
to join the coup and, hence, z = 1, a contradiction. By the same token, if tc ≤ tc1(ε) then
when a fraction ε of the citizens join the coup we have that no citizen has incentives to join
the coup and, hence, z = 0, a contradiction. Thus, any c-equilibrium where the fraction of
the citizens that join the coup belongs to the interval (0, 1) must be such that (tc, ε) with
tc ∈ (tc1(ε), tc2(ε)]. This c-equilibrium is possible as long as tc1(ε) < 1 and tc2(ε) ≥ 0 (otherwise
tc would be outside the interval [0, 1]). From equation (5) we have that tc1(ε) < 1 if and only
if (1− β)y + β(1− 2ρ(ε))Ey − c < 0. Moreover, from equation (6) as c ∈ [0, Ey] it is always
the case that tc2(ε) ≥ 0.
Finally, any c-equilibrium with (tc, 1) must be such that tc > tc2(1) as otherwise when
all citizens join the coup then all citizens that do not suffer an output shock do not have
incentives to join the coup and, hence, at most a fraction ε of the citizens join the coup, a
contradiction. This c-equilibrium is possible if and only if tc2(1) ∈ [0, 1). From equation (6)
we have that tc2(1) < 1 if and only if (1 − β) − βEy − c < 0. Moreover, as c ∈ [0, Ey] it is
always the case that tc2(1) ≥ 0.
In order to prove that an equilibrium always exists it suffices to observe that if c-
equilibrium 1 does not exists then it follows that (1 − β)y + βEy − c < 0, which implies
(1− β)y + β(1− 2ρ(ε))Ey − c < 0 and, hence, c-equilibrium 2 exists.
Proof of Proposition 5. Under elitism, if c = 0 and no peasant revolts (x = 0) then equations
(1) and (2) imply that tr1(0) = t
r
2(0) = 1. Thus, ∆u
e(0) ≥ 0 and by Proposition 2 no member
of the elite prefers tax rate tr2(0) over tax rate t
r
1(0).
15 Moreover, since the elite is choosing
15We remind the reader that for all x ∈ [0, 1] if tr1(x) = t
r
2(x) then the elite is in effect choosing tax rate
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tax rate tr1(0) ∈ [0, 1], by definition of tr1(0) no peasant wants to revolt when a fraction of 0
peasants revolt.
To prove the result under populism simply use the result in Proposition 4 when c = 0.
Proof of Proposition 6. Fix any fraction of the citizens that join the coup z ∈ [0, 1]. We claim
that a situation where a fraction λ ∈ [max{1− z
ε
, ε− z} , 1− z]∩ [0, 1] of the citizens set up
any tax rate tcλ ≤ tc1(z) if they join the coup and the coup is successful, a fraction z1 = (1−λ)−z1−ε
of the citizens set up any tax rate tcz1 ∈ (tc1(z), tc2(z)] if they join the coup and the coup is
successful, and a fraction z2 =
z−ε(1−λ)
1−ε of the citizens set up any tax rate t
c
z2
≥ tc2(z) if they
join the coup and the coup is successful, is a c-equilibrium.
First, note that given the restrictions on λ we have that λ ∈ [0, 1], z1 ∈ [0, 1] and z2 ∈ [0, 1].
Second, we have that λ+z1+z2 = 1, i.e. the three fractions account for the whole population
of citizens. Third, it is true that the total fraction of the citizens that want to join the coup
equals εz1 + z2 = z.
Therefore, given the three tax rates tcλ, t
c
z1
and tcz2 , and the fact that a fraction z of the
citizens join the coup, we have that every citizen maximizes his utility by choosing whether
to join the coup and the fraction of the citizens that choose to join the coup equals z, as
required.
tr1(x) so that his peasant does not revolt.
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